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A "New" Weapon To Combat Racial Discrimination
In Employment: The Civil Rights Act Of 1866
Dobbins v. Local 212, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers'
The plaintiff Dobbins, a Negro, brought an action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under Section
1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code,2 substantially the same
provision as that enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,' and
under Title VII of -the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' He alleged that the
defendant Electrical Workers Union had committed unlawful employ-
ment practices by refusing to admit him to membership or refer him
for employment because of his race. Subsequently, plaintiff's action
was joined with one brought by -the Attorney General of the United
States, who alleged that defendant was engaging in a pattern of unlaw-
ful employment practices in violation of Title VII.5 The district court
concluded that the union had engaged in unlawful employment prac-
tices, as alleged, and that therefore Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 had been violated. Furthermore, the district court ruled that
plaintiff Dobbins had been denied "the same right .. . to make and
enforce contracts . . .as is enjoyed by white citizens," secured by the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.6 The court indicated that "[m]embership
in and/or referral status in a union is a contractual relationship and/or
a link in the chain of making a contract."' 7 Thus the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was found to restrain racially discriminatory practices
by a labor union. In effect, the decision in Dobbins has provided a
1. 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964):
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, now codified as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982 (1964).
4. 78 Stat. 253-66 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-14 (1964) [hereinafter all
references to Title VII are to those sections as numbered in the Statutes at Large].
The following table may be used to facilitate location of parallel citations in 42
U.S.C. (1964) :
Title VII 42 U.S.C. Title VII 42 U.S.C.
Section Section Section Section
701 2000e 709 2000e - 8
702 2000e - 1 710 2000e - 9
703 2000e - 2 711 2000e - 10
704 2000e - 3 712 2000e - 11
705 2000e - 4 713 2000e - 12
706 2000e - 5 714 2000e - 13
707 2000e - 6 715 2000e - 14




The action was brought under § 706(e).
5. § 707(a).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
7. 292 F. Supp. at 442.
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"new" and necessary approach to combat an old problem - racial
discrimination in employment. This approach will be explored in the
light of its relationship to other approaches to the same problem as
well as in terms of its potential effectiveness.
It is somewhat ironic that 'a statute enacted more than a century
ago has been only recently applied to a problem which existed long
before its passage. Indeed, the absence of effective legal tools to com-
bat the commission of racially discriminatory employment practices
has been one of the leading factors contributing to the wide racial dis-
parities' and concomitant antagonisms present throughout our nation
today.9 It is notable that the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, in a report of its findings, concluded that "[u] nemployment
and underemployment are among the most persistent and severe griev-
ances of our disadvantaged minorities.' ° The pervasive effect of these
conditions on the racial ghetto is inextricably linked to the problem
of civil disorder."" One recommendation of the Commission was that
"[a]rbitrary barriers to employment and promotions must be elim-
inated." 2
I.
In spite of the Dobbins decision, the application of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 to discriminatory labor practices is by no means evident.
The "right to make and enforce contracts" which is secured by the Act
is, on its face, subject to various interpretations. However, in its recent
decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,13 the Supreme Court dis-
pelled any notion that a narrow construction should be placed upon the
8. As of March, 1968, the unemployment rate for non-whites was more than
twice the comparative rate for whites. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
AuSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1968, at 217 (89th ed. 1968). It also appears that
while approximately three-fourths of employed non-whites are relegated to jobs that
may be categorized as either "blue-collar" or "service," nearly one-half of the em-
ployed whites possess jobs that may be categorized as "white-collar." Id. at 226.
Moreover, within each category (white-collar or blue-collar), the higher salaried
"supervisory" positions are usually assigned to whites. Id. It is apparent that these
disparities have largely contributed to an even wider gap. In 1966, the median income
of white families was $286 higher than the median income for all families while the
median income of non-white families was $3094 below the median. Id. at 324. "In
the problem of racial discrimination, statistics often tell much, and Courts listen."
Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1962).
9. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CYCLE TO NOWHERE 29-37 (Clearing-house Pub. No. 14, 1968). See also P. NORGREN & S. HILL, TOWARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT
84 (1964); M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOY-
MENT 3-8 (1966) ; Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 22 RUT. L. REV. 465 (1968). An excellent analysis of the economic,
sociological, and psychological dimensions of the problems of assuring non-discrimina-
tory employment to Negroes is presented by H. SHEPPARD & H. STRINER, CIVIL
RIGHTS, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE SOCIAL STATUS ov AMERICAN NEGROES (1966).
10. The Commission reported that among residents of the urban areas affected by
civil disorders during 1967, grievances concerning unemployment and underemploy-
ment, including job discrimination, were, next to those concerning police practices, the
most prevalent and intense. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS 80-83 (1968).
11. Id. at 231.
12. Id. at 233.
13. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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scope of protection afforded by the 1866 Act. The Court, in Jones,
set the stage for the Dobbins holding by indicating that labor contracts
were among those which all persons are entitled to "make and enforce"
under the Act. 4 Dobbins was the first case to extend the principles
enunciated in Jones to prohibit racially discriminatory labor practices.
In ,the Jones case, a negro plaintiff sought an injunction and dam-
ages against a privately operated real estate company which refused
to sell him a house because of his race. The action was predicated upon
Section 1982 of Title 42 of the United States Code, a provision orig-
inally contained in the 1866 Act: "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right in every state and territory, as it is enjoyed
by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and con-
vey real and personal property."' 5 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed the complaint;6 the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling.'7 In each instance, the court reasoned that a cause of action
had not been stated under the Act because the practices complained of
were allegedly committed by private individuals.
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that an equitable claim for
relief had been stated. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Stewart,
examining the language and structure of the 1866 Act, declared that
the Act "... was meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations
of the rights enumerated in the statute . . ."" and that the "right"
secured by Section 1 of the 1866 Act - to purchase real property -
was sufficiently broad to impose a restraint upon all private individual
or group racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. In
reaching this conclusion, the majority relied heavily upon the legislative
history of the Act, which, the Court felt, supported a broad interpreta-
tion.' 9
14. Id. at 442-43 n.78. See notes 31 & 32 infra and accompanying text.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964). §§ 1981 and 1982 of Title 42 were originally em-
bodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
16. 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
17. 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
18. 392 U.S. at 426 (emphasis by the Court).
19. Id. at 422-37. During its examination of the congressional debates surround-
ing the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court made frequent reference to
the statements of Senator Trumbull, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
who introduced the legislation upon the Senate floor. The scope of the Civil Rights
Bill was defined by the Senator at the time of its introduction:
Mr. President, I regard the bill to which the attention of the Senate is now called
as the most important measure that has been under its consideration since the
adoption of the Constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. That amendment
declared that all persons in the United States should be free. This measure is
intended to give effect to that declaration and secure to all persons within the
United States practical freedom. There is very little importance in the general
declaration of abstract truths and principles unless they can be carried into effect,
unless the persons who are to be affected by them have some means of availing
themselves of the benefits.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (emphasis added).
The rights enumerated in § 1 of the bill were referred to by the Senator as
"the great fundamental rights: . . . the right to acquire property, the right to go and
come at pleasure, the right to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to
inherit and dispose of property." Id. at 475 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the
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Following its determination of the scope of the 1866 Act, the Jones
Court considered its constitutionality. The power to enact legislation
having such broad range and effect was found to be derived from the
enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment.2" The Court stated that
".. . that clause clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws necessary
and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States.' "21 The Jones majority found that the only limitation
upon the power of Congress to enact legislation under this clause was
that its exercise had to be rational; the Court further concluded that
it had been rational for Congress -to determine that "badges and inci-
dents of slavery" included restraints placed upon the rights enumerated
in the 1866 Act. 2 The Court further concluded that a "relic of slavery"
exists when ". . . racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and
makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin.
.".23 Clearly, the Jones Court would not limit its view of the "badges
and incidents" of slavery simply to the restraints on the right to pur-
chase property.
Although neither the language, structure nor legislative history of
the 1866 Act is as conclusive as the Jones majority would lead one to
believe,24 it does appear probable that the result in Jones would have
been the same if the Jones Court had been presented with the facts and
issues before the court in Dobbins. It would seem that, under the Jones
decision, any individual may be restrained from engaging in any prac-
Senator stated that the affirmative guarantee to all men, whatever their race or color,
of those basic civil rights would "break down all discrimination between black men
and white men." Id. at 599. According to the Jones Court, these declarations as to
the bill's scope by the Senate floor leader were "disputed by none." 392 U.S. at 433.
For example, Senator Cowan, an opponent of the bill, stated that as he understood
its meaning and intent, ". . . it is that there shall be no discrimination made between
the inhabitants of the several States of this union, none in any way." CONG. GLOBZ,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474, 500 (1866).
While Jones applies the 1866 Act only to discriminatory housing practices,
it appears that the heavy emphasis placed upon the Senate floor leader's pronounce-
ments indicates that the Jones majority would approve of the application of the 1866
statute to redress other racially discriminatory practices.
20. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII: "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."
21. 392 U.S. at 439 (emphasis by the Jones Court quoting from the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
22. The Court pointed out that:
[T]his Court recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have encompassed,
the badges and incidents of slavery - its burdens and disabilities - included
restraints upon "those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom;
namely, the same right [to make and enforce contracts] to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 22.
Id. at 441. The majority opinion in Jones omitted reference to the fundamental right
"to make and enforce contracts" in the passage quoted from the Civil Rights Cases
apparently because the reference was irrelevant to the issues raised in Jones.
23. Id. at 442-43.
24. See 392 U.S. at 449 (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.). Law review commentary
has been highly critical of the Jones majority's reasoning. See, e.g., Henkin, On Draw-
ing Lines, Forword to The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. Rxv. 63 (1968).
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tice which would have the effect of denying rights secured by Section
1 of the 1866 Act.25
Portions of the majority opinion in Jones support the more specific
proposition that the commission of any racially discriminatory employ-
ment practice is a denial of the "same right ... to make and enforce
contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens. ' 2' The Court indicated
that references in the congressional debates "to employers who refused
to pay their Negro workers, [and] white planters who agreed among
themselves not to hire freed slaves' 27 are "instances of private mistreat-
ment [which] were understood as illustrative of the evils that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 would correct. ' 28
It is of even greater significance that the Jones decision overrules
Hodges v. United States,29 insofar as it is inconsistent with the Jones
interpretation of the thirteenth amendment. In Hodges, white defend-
ants had denied wages to Negro plaintiffs, harassed them and discharged
them from their jobs at the defendant's lumber mill. The defendants
were convicted "of conspiring to prevent the Negroes from exercising
the right to contract for employment, a right secured by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. ... -"3 This conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court.
25. § 1 of the 1866 Act includes the provisions now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982 (1964). The Jones case was brought under § 1982; Dobbins was filed under§ 1981. The Jones Court clearly indicated that the purpose of § 1 was to "...
prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of the rights enumerated in the statute."
392 U.S. at 426.
26. Henkin, On Drawing Lines, Forword to The Supreme Court, 1967 Term,
82 HARV. L. Rtv. 63, 85-86 (1968) : ". . . by the [Jones] Court's technique of con-
struction, the right 'to make and enforce contracts' guaranteed by the 1886 Act . . .
should prevent any employer from refusing 'to make a contract' of employment with
a Negro .. " See also Tenbrock, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States - Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment,
39 CALMF L. Rzv. 171, 186 (1951) (" 'the right to make and enforce contracts' safe-
guards men in their labor relations, business affairs and ordinary transactions");
Note, Open Housing and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 82 HARV. L. R~v. 95, 103
(1968) ("Thus, the 1866 Act may be a fair employment act as well as a fair
housing act").
27. 392 U.S. at 427-28. See, e.g., the remarks of Representative Windom:
Its [the Bill's] object is to secure to a poor weak class of laborers the right
to make contracts for their labor, the power to enforce the payment of their wages,
and the means of holding the proceeds of their toil.
Do you call that man free who cannot choose his own employer, or name the
wages for which he will work?
CONG. GLOBt, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159, 1160 (1866).
28. 392 U.S. at 428 n.40.
29. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
30. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442 n.78 (1968). Defendants
in Hodges were convicted under what is now 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964):
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so
exercised the same; . . .
They shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
The provision now embodied in § 241 was, at the time of the Hodges decision, em-
bodied within § 5508 of the Rev. Stat. of 1874-1878. The only difference between the
two provisions is that § 5508 provided that its violation would result in a fine not to
exceed $5000 and imprisonment for not more than ten years.
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In overruling Hodges, the Jones Court pointed out that the terms of
Section 1981, emphasizing the "right . . . to make and enforce con-
tracts", "closely parallel those of § 1982."'l The Jones majority ana-
lyzed both the majority and dissenting opinions in Hodges:
The majority recognized that "one of the disabilities of slav-
ery, one of the indicia of its existence, was a lack of power to
make or perform contracts." . . . And there was no doubt that
the defendants had deprived their Negro victims, on racial grounds,
of the opportunity to dispose of their labor by contract. Yet the
majority . . . asserted that only conduct which actually enslaves
someone can be subjected to punishment under legislation enacted
to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. . . . Mr. Justice Harlan,
joined by Mr. Justice Day, dissented. In their view, the inter-
pretation the majority placed upon the Thirteenth Amendment
was "entirely too narrow and . . . hostile to the freedom estab-
lished by the Supreme Law of the land." . . . That interpretation
went far, they thought, "towards neutralizing many declarations
made as to the object of the recent Amendments of the Constitu-
tion, a common purpose of which, this court has said, was to
secure to a people theretofore in servitude, the free enjoyment,
without discrimination merely on account of their race, of the
essential rights that appertain to American citizenship and to free-
dom."
' 32
It thus appears that the Dobbins decision is firmly supported by
the Supreme 'Court's decision in Jones.3  First, the determination in
Dobbins that "[g]overnmental sanction or participation is no longer
a necessary factor in the assertion of a § 1981 action"3 4 derives direct
support from the finding in Jones that Section 1 of the 'Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was intended to secure its enumerated rights against gov-
ernmental and private interference. Secondly, the Jones Court's rejec-
tion of its earlier decision in Hodges supports the implication of the
Dobbins court that racially discriminatory labor practices are among
31. 392 U.S. at 442 n.78.
32. Id. at 442-43 n.78 (emphasis added).
33. See Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom Revisited: Some
First Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 22 RuT. L. Rgv. 537, 539(1968): I would suggest that the far reaching implications of this bold and calculated
step cannot be underestimated. It is no accident that the Warren era opened
with Brown v. Board of Education and closed with Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Company. The pronouncements of the Court in Jones are not casual dicta. The
words are written clearly and bluntly, and are meant, in the greatest tradition of
the Court, to be read by the people.
34. 292 F. Supp. at 442. Nevertheless, the Dobbins court also found a sufficient
presence of governmental activity to constitute a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, in the event that "state action" was still a
necessary requirement to bring an action under § 1981. It should also be noted that
prior to the Dobbins decision, the district court in Colbert v. H-K Corp., 59 CCH
Lab. Cas. ff 9192 (N.D. Ga., Aug. 8, 1968), ruled that § 1981 cannot be used in the
absence of state action. However, the Colbert court made no reference to Jones.
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the "relics of slavery."35 Finally, the indication conveyed by the Jones
Court, during its 'analysis of Hodges, that certain racially discrimina-
tory employment practices interfered with the contract right secured
by Section 1981, appears to support the similar determination reached
by the Dobbins court.3 6
In re Parrott,37 a case decided within twenty years of the enact-
ment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, also supports the application
of Section 1981 to labor contracts. In that case, a California statute
which prohibited domestic corporations from employing orientals was
challenged under the 1866 Act. The Circuit Court for ,the District of
California invalidated the statute, finding that i~t interfered with "the
right to labor" which was regarded "[a] fter the .right to live, the funda-
mental, inalienable right of man. . .""8 The Civil Rights Act of 1866
was violated, since ". . contracts to labor, such as all other make, are
contracts which [all persons] have a 'right to make and enforce ...
as is enjoyed by white citizens.' -3" There also have been more recent
cases involving actions brought under Section 1981 in which racial
discrimination in employment was alleged and relief requested. Though
the charges of discrimination were often verified and relief granted, a
finding of a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment
made it unnecessary for these courts to decide the specific applicability
of Section 1981.40
35. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that one badge of
slavery which remains today is that "[tihe black is often barred from a labor union
because of his race." 392 U.S. at 448. The Jones majority and concurring opinions
on this point were given a recent application in Baker v. City of Petersberg, 400 F.2d
294 (5th Cir. 1968). In Baker, Negro police officers sought equitable relief pursuant
to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment alleging racially discrimi-
natory working assignments. In granting the requested relief, the court stated, "This
is the kind of badge of slavery the thirteenth amendment condemns." Id. at 300 (citing
the majority and concurring opinions in Jones) (dictum).
36. The Dobbins decision itself dealt with a contract for union membership and/or
referral status. The Dobbins opinion cited International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gon-
zales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), to lend support to its construction of the term "contract"
embodied within § 1981. In Machinists, a labor union expelled the plaintiff from its
membership. Subsequently, the plaintiff brought an action, seeking equitable relief and
damages, in which he alleged the union's breach of contract. The Supreme Court noted
that under California law "membership in a labor union constitutes a contract between
the member and the union, the terms of which are governed by the constitution and
by-laws of the union...." Id. at 618. Moreover, the Court pointed out that "[tihis
contractual conception of the relation between a member and his union widely prevails
in this country. ... Id.
37. 1 F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).
38. Id. at 506 (opinion of Sawyer, J.).
39. Id. at 509 (opinion of Sawyer, J.) (emphasis by the court).
40. Most of the cases involved actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983
(which requires a showing that the defendant acted "under color of law"), and their
predecessors, with the courts addressing themselves to the question of the presence
or absence of state action. See, e.g., Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses,
360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966) (discharge of Negro nurses from their jobs for eating
in a whites-only cafeteria held to have violated §§ 1981 and 1983) ; Kerr v. Enoch
Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945) (library's refusal to admit Negro
to job training program held to have violated §§ 1981 and 1983) ; Mills v. Board of
Educ., 30 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1939) (payment of racially discriminatory wages
to Negro teacher held to have violated §§ 1981 and 1983).
Although a showing of state action is still required for § 1983 actions, Jones
has indicated that § 1981 can be applied to private action.
[VOL. XXIX
DOBBINS v. LOCAL 212, IBEW
A question which remains largely unanswered by the Jones and
Dobbins decisions is whether there is any racially discriminatory labor
practice which does not interfere with the right to make or enforce
a labor contract. There are two views as to the possible construction
of the "right" secured by the 1866 statute. One view is that the term
"right" should be construed to mean "legal capacity."'" Under this
view, it can be argued that an employer who refuses to hire an in-
dividual on racial grounds has not impaired that individual's "legal
capacity" -to contract, if it can be shown that a contract can be made
with another employer. The second interpretation, however, broadens
the scope of the secured "right" to include a right to require an employer
who refuses to contract on racial grounds, to employ the individual
irrespective of whether employment is available elsewhere. It is the
latter construction which is accepted by the Supreme Court in Jones
during its analysis of the Section 1982 "right" to purchase and which
appears to have been applied in Dobbins. The Jones Court cited Hurd
v. Hodge,4" in which white property owners sought to enforce racially
restrictive covenants against Negro purchasers of several homes on
their block. The Court pointed out that:
The agreements in Hurd covered only two-thirds of the lots
of a single city block, and preventing Negroes from buying or
renting homes in that specific area would not have rendered them
ineligible to do so elsewhere in the city. Thus, if § 1982 had been
thought to do no more than grant Negro citizens the legal capacity
to buy and rent property free of prohibitions that wholly disabled
them because of their race, judicial enforcement of the restrictive
covenants at issue would not have violated § 1982. But this Court
took a broader view of the statute. Although the covenants could
have been enforced without denying the general right of Negroes
to purchase or lease real estate, the enforcement of those covenants
would nonetheless have denied the Negro purchasers the same
right "as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property .... " That
result, this Court concluded, was prohibited by § 1982. To sug-
gest otherwise, the Court said, "is to reject the plain meaning of
the language.""'
The majority in Jones, by overruling Hodges v. United States, implied
that the right to contract is impaired where unlawful employment prac-
tices include racial discrimination in compensation, harassment of Negro
workers and discharge of Negroes from their employment,44 the dis-
criminatory practices alleged in Hodges. To this list must now be added,
as a result of Dobbins, the refusal of a labor union to admit Negroes to
membership and to refer them for employment. However, the applica-
41. See Henkin, On Drawing Lines, Forword to The Supreme Court, 1967
Term, 82 HARV. L. Rmv. 63, 96 (1968).
42. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
43. 392 U.S. at 418-19 (emphasis added).
44. 392 U.S. at 442.
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tion of the 1866 Act to discrimination in seniority, promotion and job
classification has not been judicially established, and, thus, may still be
open ,to challenge. It is submitted that the equal right to contract for em-
ployment necessarily embodies an equal right to the deserved 'benefits
of such employment. Thus, the language of the Act may be extended
to all forms of employment discrimination.
The legislators who enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did
not, in all likelihood, foresee many of the sophisticated discriminatory
employment practices which exist today. Thus, it may be ,argued that
only those discriminatory labor practices existing at the time that the
newly-freed slaves were seeking employment were affected by the Act.
In response, however, it can also 'be argued that the phrase "to make
and enforce contracts" was intended to cover all forms of racial dis-
crimination in employment. It has been observed that the Civil Rights
Act was drafted to secure "practical freedom" and, therefore, "give
effect" to the declarations of the thirteenth amendment. Thus, it would
seem that the Act was drafted to meet both the problems existing at
the time of its enactment -and those which might arise in the future.
It appears then, that invoking the 1866 Act to seek relief against dis-
crimination in seniority, promotions, job classifications or any other
discriminatory labor practice would be entirely consistent with the
broad effect that the Act was meant to have.
II.
One explanation for the extension of the 1866 Act in Dobbins is
the failure of recent attempts by the state and federal legislatures to
produce an effective weapon to combat racial discrimination in employ-
ment.
At present, forty-one states have enacted some form of fair em-
ploymen-t practices (FEP) law.45 Most of the state statutes are pat-
terned after the one adopted by New York in 194546 and, like the
New York statute, provide for -administrative enforcement. 47 In gen-
eral, most of the state FEP laws prohibit employers, employment agen-
45. An analysis of state FEP laws is presented by P. NORGREN & S. HILL,
TOWARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT 93-148 (1964); M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 19-60 (1966); BUREAU or NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION (1964);
J. WITHERSPOON, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (1968);
Bonfield, The Origin and Development of American Fair Employment Legislation,
52 IOWA L. REV. 1043 (1967) (including an analysis of early state efforts).
In addition to those states that have FEP laws, it should be noted that there
are also many municipalities which have enacted fair employment ordinances, often
patterned after the administratively enforced state statutes. See, e.g., BALTIMORE,
MD. CODE §§ 1-10, 15-21 (1966).
46. Ch. 118, [1945] N.Y. Laws 457, now codified as N.Y. Ex-c. LAW §§ 290-301(McKinney Supp. 1968). The New York statute is considered to be the first
modern fair employment practices law. See Bonfield, The Origin and Development
of American Fair Employment Legislation, 52 IOWA L. REv. 1043, 1071-73 (1967).
47. Approximately thirty states have enacted FEP statutes providing for adminis-
trative enforcement. See J. WITHERSPOON, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF
CIVIL RIGHTS, app. A & E (1968). In addition, eleven states provide that prohibitions
against job discrimination are to be enforced by either private suits or criminal pro-
ceedings. Id. at app. F.
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cies, unions, and apprenticeship programs controlled by management
and/or labor from engaging in virtually any form of discrimination
due to an individual's race, color, creed or national origin.4  Enforce-
ment of the act is usually delegated to a fair employment practices
commission (FEPC) that is empowered, upon an individual's com-
plaint, to enforce the act's prohibitions by either "conference, concilia-
tion and persuasion" or through the issuance of a "cease and desist"
order, following a public hearing. Despite these provisions, the broad
purpose underlying the FEP statutes - to eliminate employment dis-
crimination within the state - has not been accomplished.49  The
reasons usually advanced for the ineffectiveness of the state procedures
can be grouped into three categories: legislatively imposed restrictions
within the statutes themselves tending to limit the authority of the
enforcing agency,5" a lack of "aggressiveness" on the part of the FEPC
48. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 1-3, 12-15, 17-20 (1968), as amended,
ch. 83, §§ 1, 12, [1968] Md. Laws 113 (amendment merely changes the name of the
enforcing agency). The Maryland Fair Employment Practices Law declares that it
is an unlawful employment practice for:
1. An "employer" to ". . . refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate . . . with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, creed, sex or
national origin." Id. at § 19(a).
2. An employment agency to discriminate on the basis of an individual's race,
color, creed, or national origin with respect to the agency's job referrals, classifica-
tions, "or otherwise." Id. at § 19(b).
3. A union "(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise
to discriminate against, any individual . . .; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify its
membership, or to classify or fail . .. to refer for employment any individual . .
because of his race, color, creed, or national origin. Id. at § 19(c).
4. "[A]ny employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job train-
ing programs to discriminate ... [by denying] admission to, or employment in, any
program established to provide apprenticeship or other training" on the basis of race,
color, creed or national origin. Id. at § 19(d).
Most state FEP laws do not make sex discrimination unlawful. In Maryland,
only an employer cannot discriminate on the basis of sex. Id. at § 19(a).
49. See H. HILL, TWENTY YEARS OF STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE COM-
MISSIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1964); M. SOVERN,
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 31-60 (1966);
J. WITHERSPOON, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION or CIVIL RIGHTS 138, 214 (1968);
Field, Hindsight and Foresight About FEPC, 14 Bur. L. Rev. 16 (1964); Note,
Current Racial Legal Developments, 12 How. L.J. 299, 316 (1966).
"Given the significant developments in the American economy during the
last twenty years together with the current status of the Negro wage-earner in states
with FEPC laws we must conclude on the basis of the evidence that state FEPC
laws have failed." H. HILL, supra at 23.
50. Most state FEP laws include a provision which limits the act's coverage to
employers with a minimum number of employees. For example, the Maryland FEP
law applies to only those employers with twenty-five or more employees. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 18(b) (1968). It has been estimated by one commentator that this
limitation means that 92% of all Maryland employers are not covered by the act.
J. WITHERSPOON, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OP CIVIL RIGHTS 138, 148 (1968).
In many state FEP laws, a provision empowering the FEPC to initiate its
own complaints is conspicuously absent. The impact of the omission becomes clear
when it is considered that, compared to the extensive employment discrimination
occurring, few complaints are filed with the state commissions. Id. at 159-60. For
example, the Maryland FEPC received only 185 complaints alleging job discriminationduring 1967. COMMISSION ON INTERRACIAL PROBLEMS AND RELATIONS, ANNUAL
REPORT 19 (1968).
It has also been observed that the omission of a provision allowing a state
commission to secure a temporary restraining order, in the case where it is alleged
that a job has been discriminatorily denied, "means that the commission often has
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charged with the statute's enforcement,5 ' and a legislative unwilling-
ness to commit the necessary budget and staff to the project.5"
Before Jones it was a widely held belief that an action under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 could only be brought if the state had
"participated" in the wrongful conduct. Until Congress acted again
nearly one hundred years later by approving the Civil Rights Act of
19 6 4 ,53 it was generally believed that legislative relief was not available
no adequate remedy to provide [to] a complainant whom it later finds has a justified
grievance relative to the job . . . lost." J. WITHERSPOON, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 138, 190, 191-98 (1968).
51. For example, the Maryland Commission reported that it was only able to
resolve 19 of the 185 complaints (19.8%) received during 1967 alleging employment
discrimination (including 133 complaints alleging racial discrimination). COMMISSION
ON INTERRACIAL PROBLEMS AND RELATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1968). In a report
of a study made by the Department of Justice, the Maryland Commission was pictured
as "suffering from 'a restrained and timid concept of its role,' handicapped by a
crippling lack of vigor, funds and adequate staff." Wash. Post, Feb. 23, 1969, § D,
at 1, col. 5.
Other state commissions have also been criticized on similar grounds. See
H. HILL, TWENTY YEARS OF STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE COMMISSIONS:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 24-26 (1964); M. SOVERN, LEGAL
RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 46-53 (1966) ; G. Schermer,
Effectiveness of Equal Opportunity Legislation, in THE NEGRO AND EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY 67, 80-82 (H. Northrup & R. Rowan eds. 1965) ; Field, Hindsight and
Foresight About FEPC, 14 BuP. L. REv. 16 (1964).
52. For example, the Maryland Commission was appropriated only $98,739 and
staffed with only thirteen employees during 1968. COMMISSION ON INTERRACIAL
PROBLEMS AND RELATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 66 (1968).
53. More limited efforts by the federal government to restrain employment dis-
crimination were undertaken prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Beginning in 1941, executive orders have provided an administrative remedy for those
discriminated against by agencies of the federal government, contractors and subcon-
tractors who are parties to federal contracts, and, more recently, contractors working
on projects financed in whole or in part by federal funds. Exec. Order No. 11,246,
3 C.F.R. 611 (1968), has superseded all prior similar orders and is still in effect.
Effectiveness of the order has apparently been impeded by a lack of aggressiveness on
the part of the agency charged with its enforcement. See 70 LAB. REL. REP. 87. The
federal executive orders are analyzed by M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 102-43 (1966) ; Bonfield, The Origin and Develop-
ment of American Fair Employment Legislation, 52 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1062-67, 1078-
82, 1086-87 (1967) ; Comment, Remedies Available to a Victim of Employment Dis-
crimination, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 456 (1968).
A federal requirement of non-discriminatory labor practices has also been
found to be embodied within the terms of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-68 (1964), and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-62 (1964). In Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), the Supreme Court construed the
Railway Labor Act as requiring a union to represent all of the members in its bargain-
ing unit, including non-union and minority members alike, "without hostile discrimi-
nation, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." Id, at 204. For a similar construction
of the National Labor Relations Act, see Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255
(1944). Relief can be sought for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation
either by initiating a civil action or filing an unfair labor practices charge with the
National Labor Relations Board. A recent decision has extended this remedy to the
unilateral racially discriminatory practices of an employer. Packinghouse Food &
Allied Workers v. NLRB, 59 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 13254 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 7, 1969).
Neither of the two avenues have been frequently utilized due to the alternative
process available under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for seeking relief against union
discrimination. Remedies afforded by the fair representation doctrine for relief against
racial discrimination have been permitted despite the remedies available under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., Local 12, Rubber Workers v. NLRB,
368 F.2d 12, 24 (5th Cir. 1966). On the duty of fair representation, see M. SOVERN,
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 143-75 (1966).
The federal efforts are analyzed by Jenkins, A Study of Federal Efforts to End Job
Bias: A History, a Status Report, and a Prognosis, 14 How. L.J. 259 (1968).
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to those who had been denied their "practical freedom" by the commis-
sion of racially discriminatory employment practices. Although Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represents a major federal effort
to eliminate barriers to equal employment opportunity, its eventual
achievement of the broad goals envisioned by many of its supporters54
is open to serious doubt. Title VII provides55 that virtually any form
of employment discrimination influenced by an individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin is prohibited. Generally, its prohibitions
apply to employers, employment agencies, unions, and labor-manage-
ment apprenticeship programs.56 However, a substantial number of
employers, employment agencies and unions have been removed from
the reach of Title VII by the addition of exemption provisions. For
example, the Title's prohibitions apply only to those employers with
twenty-five or more employees.57 Thus, Title VII's limited scope leaves
many aggrieved individuals without a federal remedy.
Although Title VII does provide for judicial enforcement," relief
must be initially sought administratively. If the alleged discriminatory
practice occurred in a state which has enacted a FEP statute, an action
under Title VII cannot be commenced until the aggrieved individual
has pursued the state administrative remedy for at least sixty days. 9
If no state remedy is available, or if there is dissatisfaction with the
state's efforts to remedy the unlawful practice, the aggrieved party
may seek relief under Title VII by initially filing a charge with the
54. See, e.g., Additional Views on J.R. 7152 of Hon. W.M. McCulloch, Hon.
John V. Lindsay, Hon. C. MacGregor, Hon. Chas. McC. Mathias, Hon. J.E. Brom-
well, H.R. RsP. No. 914 (pt. II), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) in BUREAU OP
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT oF 1964 (1964). "A nation need not
and should not be converted into a welfare state to reduce poverty, lessen crime, cut
down unemployment, or overcome shortages in skilled occupational categories. All
that is needed is the institution of proper training programs and the elimination of
discrimination in employment practices." Id. at 283.
55. Title VII's provisions are largely patterned after those of the state FEP laws.
See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
56. § 703(a)-(d).
57. § 701(b) :
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has twenty-five or more employees . ..but such term does not in-
clude (1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the government
of the United States, an Indian tribe, or a State or political subdivision thereof
[and], (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organiza-
tion) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1954.
(emphasis added). It has been estimated that "fewer than 8 per cent of all employers
in business affecting interstate commerce . . .are covered." J. WITHERSPOON, AD-
MINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 147 (1968).
Also, "employment agency" under Title VII does not include "an agency
of the United States, or an agency of a State or political subdivision of a State,
except that such term shall include the United States Employment Service and the
system of state and local employment services receiving federal assistance." § 701 (c).
Furthermore, "[tihe term 'labor organization' means a labor organization
engaged in an industry affecting commerce. . . ." § 701(d). "A labor organization
shall be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce if (1) it main-
tains . . . a hiring hall . . .or (2) the number of its members . . . is . . . (c) twenty-





United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).0
The statute of limitations for commencing a Title VII action is short.
Thus, where no state remedy is available, a charge must be brought
to the EEOC within ninety days "after the alleged unlawful employ-
ment occurred."" a A proportionately longer filing period is allowed
where the aggrieved party has also pursued the remedy afforded by
a state FEP law."2 A judicial proceeding under Title VII cannot be
brought unless the charge has been filed with the Commission within
the designated time. Should the Commission, upon its investigation,
find that the charge of discrimination is true, it may employ only ad-
ministrative enforcement tools, "conference, conciliation, and persua-
sion."'6 3
However, it appears that a judicial proceeding under Title VII
can be brought before the Commission has attempted to secure com-
pliance. Thus, it has been ruled that a civil suit under Title VII can
be brought following the receipt of a notice from the Commission that
it has been "unable to secure compliance.16 4 This notice can be de-
manded sixty days 'after the charge has been filed regardless of whether
the Commission has acted during that period. 65
In view of the absence of strong administrative enforcement pro-
visions, the EEOC has had only limited success in securing compliance
with the Title's provisions.6" Therefore, unless the Attorney General
initiates a Title VII suit to eliminate a "pattern or practice" of discrim-
ination, the only recourse for persons who have been denied a right
-to equal employment opportunity is to initiate private actions.6 7
The Dobbins court noted a further limitation of Title VII. Recent
decisions construing the Title have indicated that judicial or adminis-
60. Normally, the aggrieved party will initially seek relief from the EEOC. If
necessary, the Commission will defer the charge to a state FEPC for the minimum
sixty day period. See Rosen, Division of Authority Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964: A Preliminary Study in Federal State Interagency Relations,
34 Gno. WASH. L. RIv. 846 (1966).
61. § 706(d).
62. If relief is first sought under the state FEP law, then the aggrieved party
has 210 days "after the alleged unlawful practice occurred or . . . thirty days after
receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings . . .
whichever is earlier" in which to file an additional charge with the EEOC. Id.
63. § 706(a). Additionally, the Commission may, pursuant to § 705(g) (6),
recommend to the Attorney General of the United States, the initiation of a civil
action under § 707(a), when it is believed that "any person or group of persons is
engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the
rights secured by [Title VII] .. "
64. See, e.g., Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969).
65. Id. The Commission will usually have taken no action during that period due
to its sizable backlog of complaints and the limitations placed on the size of its staff.
See Address by S. Pressman, Senior Attorney EEOC, July, 1968, in CCH EMPLOY-
MENT PRAc. GUIDE 8017, at 6041.
66. During fiscal 1967, the Commission received nearly 13,000 charges of dis-
crimination. Approximately 5,000 of the charges were referred for investigation, join-
ing 2,100 other charges pending at the end of fiscal 1966. Eventually, 890 charges
were "conciliated" (securance of a promise to comply), with the Commission claiming
successful compliance in only 383 cases. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1968).
67. See Hearings on S. 1308 Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower,
and Poverty of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 54 (1968) (testimony of Stephen N. Shulman who, at that time, was EEOC
Chairman).
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trative relief for discrimination occurring prior to its effective date
(July 2, 1965) cannot be granted.6" That date has also been employed
by some courts to bar relief where it was alleged that a practice was
unlawful because it perpetuated the effects of discrimination practiced
prior to the Title's effective date."9
Title VII has also been criticized because it often fails to provide
adequate compensation to the injured party."0 Although a court is
authorized by the statute to order that the aggrieved party be hired
or reinstated, with or without back pay, minus "interim earnings or
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence,"'" it has been argued
that this form of relief does not compensate for the psychological dam-
age suffered as a result of discrimination.7 2 Nor can a court order
directing that a Negro be reinstated in the same working environment
in which he has suffered discrimination afford him full redress for
his injury.73
The shortcomings of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are not present
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. First, unlike Title VII, Section 1981
can apparently be used to restrain the unlawful practices of any em-
ployer, employment agency, labor union, or labor-management ap-
prenticeship program. Second, while Title VII requires the aggrieved
68. E.g., United States v. Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers, 280 F. Supp. 719, 728
(E.D. Mo. 1968).
69. For example, a system of job promotion and transfer which benefits those
employees with the greatest departmental seniority, although non-discriminatory on
its face, may deny an equal opportunity for advancement to Negro employees who
were discriminatorily assigned to departments with low paying positions prior to the
effective date of Title VII. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals, 296 F. Supp. 1232
(N.D. Ga. 1969) (relief denied); cJ. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243
(M.D. N.C. 1968) (relief denied - educational prerequisite). But see Quarles v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (relief granted) ; United
States v. Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D.
La. 1968) (relief granted). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently
indicated in an analogous case that it is willing to employ Title VII to remedy the
present effects of past discrimination. Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 59
CCH Lab. Cas. 1 9195 (5th Cir., Jan. 15, 1969), aff'g, Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 55
CCH Lab. Cas. 9063 (D.C. La. 1967). See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimina-
tion, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1260 (1967).
70. See, e.g., Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title
VII, 54 VA. L. Rnv. 491 (1968).
71. § 706(g). In addition, a court may "order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate." Id. There have been no reported cases in which the latter provision
has been used to provide "special" damages.
72. Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 88-89 (S.D. Ohio 1967):
Moreover, while the statutory provisions may serve to redress the pecuniary
damage resulting from discrimination, they do not take a single step toward
mending the psychological damage to both the party discriminated against and
others in the class he represents. It is evident from the testimony of the several
sociologists who appeared as witnesses in this case that discrimination in the area
of employment stunts the educational and technical potential development of the
class subject to such inequities. This Court is also mindful of the evidence sub-
mitted by experts in cases dealing with discrimination in other areas of life.
Such evidence pointed out that segregation and discrimination not only denote
inferiority of the class discriminated against, but also retard the development
of that class. . . . Injuries of this kind are not subject to any sort of monetary
valuation. Thus, the pecuniary awards allowed under the federal and state statutes
provide no adequate remedy.
Cf., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73. See Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII,
54 VA. L. Rtv. 491 (1968).
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party to pursue a state remedy, if available, and a federal administrative
remedy prior to seeking judicial relief, there are no such provisions
in .the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Thus, on its face, the 1866 Act per-
mits judicial proceedings to be instituted immediately after racial dis-
crimination has occurred. Due to the large amount of time often con-
sumed while pursuing the frequently ineffective state and federal ad-
ministrative remedies, the -absence of a similar requirement under the
1866 statute could be of great significance.
Third, although the availability of Title VII is restricted by its
short statute of limitations, "[t]here [is] no Federal statute of limita-
tions with respect to a Civil Rights Act of 1866 case, [and] the most
adaptable State statute governs. 71 4 The "most adaptable" state statute
of limitations in Dobbins was four years. 75 Furthermore, since Title
VII has been interpreted to afford redress for only those discriminatory
employment practices committed after its effective date, it may be pos-
sible to employ Section 1981 to secure relief for long-continued dis-
criminatory practices. This possibility would, of course, depend on
the length of the applicable state statute of limitations.
Finally, it is possible that Section 1981 would afford more effec-
tive relief than Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 is "couched
in declaratory terms and provides no explicit method of enforcement.
7. " The Supreme Court, in Jones, did not believe that the absence
of an enforcement provision would "prevent a federal court from
fashioning an effective equitable remedy."77 Though the Court stated
th'at the plaintiff was entitled only -to equitable relief in Jones, it strongly
implied that an injured party might also be awarded compensatory
damages under the 1866 Act.78
While the Jones Court declared that "[i]n no event, on the facts
alleged in the present complaint, would [the plaintiffs] be entitled to
punitive damages,"7 it did not reach the question of whether another
claimant under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 could receive more than
the normal equitable and compensatory relief.80 Thus, it is possible
74. Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413, 444 (S.D. Ohio 1968);
cf. Roland Elec. Co. v. Black, 163 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1947). Roland was an action
under the Fair Labor Standards Act to recover overtime compensation, liquidated
damages and counsel fees accruing over a five year period. The court looked to the
most adaptable state statute of limitations since the Act, at that time, prescribed no
period of limitation. The question then arose as to which of the state statutes would
apply and the court stated that the nature of the action would be the determining
factor. It was decided that the "suit [was] upon a contract" and was therefore
governed by the three year limitation for actions in simple contract. It was also
decided that the action was not a "suit upon a statute" for which a twelve year period
applied. See 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICY ff 3.07[2], at 741-42 (2d ed. 1967) ; Annot.,
98 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1964).
75. 292 F. Supp. at 444.
76. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 n.13 (1968).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 414 n.14.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. The Court indicated that punitive damages would not be available when the
facts alleged are similar to those alleged by the plaintiff in Jones, but left open the
question as to whether more than equitable or compensatory relief could be awarded
in other actions brought under the 1866 Act.
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for a federal court to include in its relief, a "special""' or punitive82
damage award in an appropriate case. Such an award would be espe-
cially appropriate in those cases in which the racially discriminatory
employment practices have continued to occur despite previous admoni-
tions by a state or federal agency or court. An award of this type, in
addition to its deterrent effect, might, at least partially, compensate
for the non-pecuniary injuries suffered by a victim of discrimination.
It might also have the effect of providing an added incentive for other
victims of discrimination to seek relief."'
III.
The foregoing discussion of the differences between proceedings
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 has assumed: (1) that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does
not evince a congressional intent to preclude the use of other federal
remedies for racial discrimination in employment, and (2) that the
1866 statute should not be construed to give effect to any of the more
recently enacted Title VII limitations. The decision of the Supreme
Court in Jones justifies both of these assumptions.
After the Court granted certiorari to consider the Jones case, but
before its decision was rendered, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, which contained a fair housing title. Thus, the question
arose as to whether the appropriate action in Jones would be under
the fair housing title, rather than under Section 1982. Two justices
urged dismissal of the writ because the case had "lost most of its public
importance" with the passage of the new act.84 A majority of the
Court, however, decided not to dismiss the writ, ruling that the enact-
ment of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 "had no effect upon § 1982 and
81. "[I]n any action arising out of racial discrimination, the plaintiff should be
entitled to have the jury include in his award an amount 'for deprivation of civil
rights' in addition to appropriate compensatory or punitive damages." Comment,
Civil Actions for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 T.XAS L. Riv.
1015, 1033 (1967).
82. Punitive damages have been awarded in actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1964) which, like § 1981, is silent as to the type of damage relief to be
awarded. § 1983 was originally embodied within § 2 of the 1866 Act. Civil Rights
Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27. It now provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
See Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir. 1968) ; Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d
74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965).
83. "This incentive is important since only by encouraging frequent suits can
the civil rights statutes fully accomplish their deterrent purpose." Comment, Civil
Actions for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEXAs L. Rtv.
1015, 1033 (1967).




no effect upon this litigation."" The Court pointed out that the enact-
ment of the 1968 Act:
underscored the vast difference between, on the one hand, a gen-
eral statute applicable only to racial discrimination in the rental
and sale of property and enforceable only by private parties acting
on their own initiative, and, on the other hand, a detailed housing
law applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and
enforceable by a complete arsenal of federal authority."8
Thus, the coverage of Section 1982 was, according to the Court,
"markedly different from that of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.""s
Moreover, the Court reasoned that since "[t]he Civil Rights Act of
1968 does not mention 42 U.S.C. § 1982," it could not be assumed
"that Congress intended to effect any change, either substantive or pro-
cedural, in [§ 1982]. '88
It can similarly be argued that the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 had no effect upon the availability of Section 1981 as a
federal remedy. Like Section 1982, Section 1981 is a "general statute"
applying to racial discrimination in employment contracts and is "en-
forceable only by private parties acting on their own initiative."89 On
the other hand, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has a much
broader scope; it applies to employment discrimination on the grounds
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. A "complete arsenal
of federal authority"9 is available to enforce it. Furthermore, unlike
Title VII, Section 1981 does not prohibit advertising which indicates
a discriminatory preference, 91 provide for a court-appointed attorney
and waiver of court costs to an indigent party,92 expressly allow inter-
vention by the Attorney General of the United States,9 3 nor expressly
authorize a federal court to order payment of damages.94 Finally, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not mention Section 1981, and, there-
85. Id. at 416-17. The Jones Court noted that relief was not afforded by the new
fair housing law on the facts presented by the plaintiff's claim. It was pointed out
that the defendants' housing development would not be covered by the 1968 Act until
Jan. 1, 1969; that, even then, the Act is inapplicable to redress discrimination occurring,
as in Jones, prior to April 11, 1968, the Act's effective date; and that if the Act
was applicable, the plaintiff's claim would be barred by the statute of limitations.
Although the Court was not called upon and did not reach the question of whether§ 1982 could be invoked where the 1968 Act was also applicable, it may have indicated
its future response by clearly stating that the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 "had no effect upon § 1982." Id. It is important to note that the Dobbins court
allowed the plaintiff to bring his action under both § 1981 and Title VII, although it
appears that relief was available under either remedy.
86. Id. at 417.
87. Id. at 417 n.21.
88. Id. at 417 n.20.
89. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 417 (1968).
90. Id. Thus, relief under Title VII can be achieved not only through a private
action but also through the unilateral action of the EEOC or the Attorney General




94. § 7 0 6 (g).
[VOL. XXIX
DOBBINS V. LOCAL 212, IBEW
fore, it should not be assumed that Congress, in passing the 1964 Act,
intended to effect a change in the earlier statute. 5
Some slight doubt as to the validity of the foregoing analysis is
raised by the 1969 decision of the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Erick-
son. 6 That case involved the question of "whether the City of Akron,
Ohio [had] denied to [plaintiff] the equal protection of its laws by
amending the city charter to prevent the city council from enacting any
ordinance dealing with racial . . .discrimination in housing without
the approval of the majority of the voters of Akron."97 The Court
concluded that the amendment had violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. More important to the subject at hand,
-however, was the Court's treatment of the defendant's argument that,
due to the Jones decision and the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, the case had been rendered moot. Writing for the majority,
Mr. Justice White9 rejected the argument. He correctly pointed out
that the viability of local fair housing legislation is specifically pre-
served in the 1968 Civil Rights Act, which requires the local remedy,
where available, to be pursued by the aggrieved party prior to pro-
ceeding under the federal act. 9 He stated that the 1866 Civil Rights
Act "should be read together" with the 1968 Civil Rights Act on the
subject of local fair housing legislation, "so as not to pre-empt the
local legislation which the far more detailed Act of 1968 so explicitly
preserves."1 00
It might be argued that the Hunter Court's declaration that the
1866 Act and the 1968 Act are to be read together is inconsistent
with the Jones decision and represents a retreat from the approach em-
bodied in that case. Such an argument 'is unsound, since it 'is based
on an extension of the Hunter dictum beyond its legal context. The
issue of federal pre-emption involved in the Hunter case is quite distinct
from the question of whether limitations in one statute ,are to be read
into another. When considering a question of federal pre-emption, the
Court regularly considers all of the relevant federal statutes to decide
whether Congress has intended to occupy the entire field of regula-
tion.' The 1866 and 1968 Acts were "read together" in Hunter
for this purpose. The legal doctrine of construing statutes to be in
pari materia, so that one statute can be deemed, in effect, to modify
or amend another, is far removed from the pre-emption cases. Thus,
the Jones case stands as clear authority that a plaintiff under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 may proceed against any employer, need not ex-
haust other possible state or federal remedies, and is not limited by
the short statute of limitations and restricted remedies provided in
Title VII of the 1964 Act.
95. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 417 n.20 (1968).
96. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
97. Id. at 386.
98. Mr. Justice White joined in Justice Harlan's dissent in Jones.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (Supp. 1968).
100. 393 U.S. at 388.
101. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1956).
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It does seem likely that the Hunter holding on pre-emption
in -the housing area is applicable as well to the employment situation,
and that the local remedy for discriminatory employment practices will
still be available. Furthermore, despite the availability of *a federal
remedy which may be pursued without first resorting to a state rem-
edy, the Jones interpretation of the 1866 Act does not appear to im-
pair the desirability of effective state remedies. As previously noted,
the Jones Court, during its comparison of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1968, pointed out that there are ". . . vast differences between
a general statute applicable only to racial discrimination in the
rental and sale of property and enforceable only by private parties act-
ing on their own initiative, and . . . a detailed open housing law ap-
plicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and enforceable
by a complete arsenal of federal authority.' '10 2 Like the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, -state and local fair housing laws are "detailed" and "ap-
plicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices." Moreover, the
burden of enforcing the statute usually falls upon a state or municipal
agency. On the other hand, an aggrieved party who elects to pursue
his remedy under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 must bear -the financial
burden of its enforcement. Therefore, the real choice for many in-
dividuals who find that relief is available under either local, state or
federal statutes will be an economic one. In view of the possibility that
the type of housing discrimination involved will not be covered by the
1866 statute, and, in light of the economic advantage afforded by
state and municipal fair housing laws to the aggrieved party, it can-
not be assumed that the "revival" of the former statute will cause the
latter enactments to fall into disuse. Nor is it probable, for the reasons
outlined above, that state and local FEP laws will become less viable
despite the existence of a federal remedy under Section 1981.
IV.
The Dobbins court's application of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to
restrain the commission of racially discriminatory labor practices is a
necessary step toward securing for the black man the "practical free-
dom" which he has long been denied. It has been observed that racial
discrimination in employment, as well as ". . . discrimination [which]
herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn
on the color of their skin . . .,,,'0 largely contribute to the racial dis-
parities and accompanying antagonisms present throughout our nation
today. In this context, the Supreme Court, in Jones, broadly con-
strued Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in order to provide a
legal weapon to enforce the "fundamental rights" guaranteed by the
statute. Regardless of one's analysis of the reasoning employed by
the Jones majority to reach its intended result, the decision appears
to fully support the conclusion of the Dobbins court. Moreover, it seems
entirely consistent with the reasoning and results of Jones and Dobbins
102. 392 U.S. at 417.
103. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442-43 (1968).
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to assert that the grant by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to "all persons
[of] the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is en-
joyed by white citizens...104 provides a legal tool that can be utilized
along with other state and federal remedies to restrain all racially dis-
criminatory employment practices. Although the Act has been infre-
quently invoked in the past, " '[T] he fact that the statute lay partially
dormant for many years cannot be held to diminish its force today.' ""'
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
105. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968) (quoting the oral
argument of the Attorney General of the United States).
